"Democraticialis, it's for my man whenever he wants it"
We tried almost everything. Reading together the Weekly Standard and holding hands while watching Bill O'Reilly. We even signed up for one of those Restoration Weekends in Florida that David Horowitz organizes and were hoping that Jim Woolsey's address would arouse my husband to take up this white woman's burden. But his imperial drive remained dormant until a friend, "Scooter" told us about Democraticialis ("Judy loves it," he said). And it was shock and Awe from then on... A Regime Change for My Man whenever and wherever he wants it... Democraticialis, experience the neocon difference. ***
*** Side effects could include anti-Americanism, terrorism, bloodshed, chaos, violations of civil rights, and rising budget deficits. If you experience an insurgency that lasts for more than four years, please consult Dr. "Dick" Cheney. The insurgency may be in its last throes.
January 18, 2006
Guess What? Democracies Are Not Always Peaceful
by Leon Hadar
If you've been listening to the recent "democracy is the way to go" sermons by President George W. Bush and his advisers, you'll have to conclude that embracing "democracy" – a concept that is open to different interpretations – is the cure for most of humanity's ills, ranging from political violence and economic underdevelopment to male baldness and erectile dysfunction. ("Keep the spark alive… become the best guy… for her… take Democraticialis…").
Even in its more modest version, the global democratic crusade launched by the White House and inspired by the Wilsonian neoconservative ideologues adopts what the neocons consider to be an axiom of international relations, that democracies rarely, if ever, wage war against one another. Translating that maxim into policy means that Washington has the obligation, based not only on moral considerations but also on pure self-interest, to promote democracy worldwide as the most effective way to establish international peace and stability.
Indeed, in his second inaugural address, Bush proclaimed that "the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world." He and his foreign policy aides have argued that one of the main rationales for ousting Saddam Hussein and occupying Iraq – especially since no weapons of mass destruction were discovered there – was the need to rid Mesopotamia of a tyrant, establish a democratic system, and pursue similar regime changes and advance freedom in the rest of the Arab Middle East.
The Bushies argue that democracy would not only respond to the legitimate demands of those living under authoritarian systems, but also reduce the chances for domestic instability and international wars, and in that context, retard the spread of terrorism. Not surprisingly, the Pentagon and the State Department have become major instruments for nation-building and democracy-promotion, as most members of the policy community in Washington seem to subscribe to a catchy slogan: "Make Democracy, Not War."
The debate hasn't been on whether the spread of democracy helps to strengthen the foundation for international peace, but on the most cost-effective way to promote political freedom.
But two American academics and political thinkers are challenging now this conventional wisdom. In a new book, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (MIT Press, 2005), Edward D. Mansfield of the University of Pennsylvania and Jack Snyder of Columbia University seem to pull the intellectual rug from under the rationale presented by the Bush administration for what it's doing in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East, arguing that states in the early phases of transition to democracy are actually more likely than other states to become involved in war.
Drawing on both extensive qualitative and quantitative analyses they and other political scientists have conducted, Professor Mansfield and Professor Snyder demonstrate that emerging democracies tend to have weak political institutions and are especially likely to go to war. Leaders of these countries attempt to rally support by invoking external threats and resorting to belligerent, nationalist rhetoric and slogans. They point to this pattern in cases ranging from revolutionary France to contemporary Russia. One of the most interesting case studies is the collapse of the former Yugoslavia.
As the mostly peaceful and relatively prosperous communist Yugoslavia started transitioning into democracy, the leaders of all the major ethnic groups in that country, such as Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, succeeded in exploiting nationalist sentiments as a way of getting power and mobilizing public support through an open democratic process, including free elections, creating the conditions for a civil war that has turned out to be the bloodiest chapter in European history since the end of World War II.
The thesis is backed by complex statistical models but is in its essence quite simple: Be afraid, very afraid of new democracies, as they are more likely than not to be unstable and warlike. The authors provide a mostly "institutional" explanation for this phenomenon, noting that such countries often lack the rule of law, organized political parties, professional news media, and other political and legal institutions that can place constraints on the political leaders. In the period of sweeping political changes and uncertainty that characterizes the transition to democracy, many voters aspire for a sense of identity and security and elect populists and demagogues who promote bellicose nationalism that leads to civil and inter-state wars.
Pointing to the Bush administration's campaign to build up democracy in Iraq and spread it to Palestine, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, the authors warn that "unleashing Islamic mass opinion through a sudden democratization could only raise the likelihood of war." In a way, the political changes in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East have become a laboratory for testing the author's theories, which seem to have been corroborated by events.
In Iraq, the recent parliamentary elections helped to consolidate the power of the leaders of radical Shi'ite parties and those who represent the Kurdish separatist national movement; not surprisingly, Arab Sunnis also voted in support of their sectarian representatives. If anything, the ousting of Saddam Hussein and the free elections have led to more political instability and ethnic and religious violence, thereby creating the conditions for a Yugoslavia-like civil war. In Egypt, the members of the anti-Western Muslim Brotherhood movement have strengthened their position in the last elections, while in Palestine, most observers expect the radical Islamic Hamas to gain more power in the coming parliamentary vote.
And let's not forget that last year's presidential election in Iran – which is clearly more open than, say, Saudi Arabia – ended with the victory of the most radical anti-American figure in the race. In short, as the authors suggest, the collapse of the old authoritarian regimes in the Middle East has given birth to weak and unstable states and the rise to power – through free elections – of warlike, ultranationalist politicians.
Mansfield and Snyder focus most of the discussion in their book on emerging democracies and suggest that mature democracies tend to be peaceful. Hence, their implication is that Washington and other Western powers have an interest to help create the foundations of functioning political, economic, and legal institutions in emerging democracies before moving to hold elections there.
But they don't explain why, say, Iraqis or Palestinians would accept such an arrangement, that is, postponing free elections until their countries are ready for democracy. Who will make that decision, and who will take control of the country's security until a democratically elected government comes to power sometime in the future?
Moreover, it seems to me that you don't need to apply complex statistical models to figure out that the main cause of wars in the modern age, since the time of the French Revolution, has been nationalism, and that democracy is the most loyal ally of nationalism in the sense that it indeed empowers the people to rally behind their nation, ethnicity, religion, and tribe and help drive into power populist figures that thrive during times of civil wars and wars between nation-states.
If anything, the history of Europe in the 19th century suggests that authoritarian governments were more successful in maintaining a relative peace in the continent for close to a century. Similarly, the most peaceful European states during World War II and the ones that avoided entering the war were Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, and Turkey, three non-democratic regimes, and Switzerland, which granted women the right to vote only in 1971(!).
Perhaps the time has come for an innovative political scientist to conduct research to determine whether – and I know it's not very PC – non-democracies are actually more peaceful than democratic states.
Copyright © 2005 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. All rights reserved.
Democracies don't go to war against each other